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Abstract
This paper discusses environmental policy instruments in a differential-game
model of international trade with oligopolistic competition. Strategic interactions
occur if ﬁrms use feedback strategies and therefore react on decisions of their com-
petitor. Eventually this harms ﬁrm proﬁts, because all ﬁrms act strategically.
A ﬁrm reacts differently if its competitor is subject to an environmental standard
than if it is subject to an environmental tax. Under open-loop investment strategies
and feedback strategies of energy use, environmental taxes always give rise to more
investment for strategic reasons than standards. This conﬁrms results of multistage
staticmodels of the same problem. The new result is thatunder feedback investment
strategies the reverse can be the case.
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11 Introduction
Flexibility is an important reason to advocate economic environmentalpolicy instruments
likeemissiontaxes. Morethanundertraditionalcommandand controlmeasures, polluters
can choose to what degree and in which way they decrease their pollution. Consequently,
the regulator may reach a high allocative efﬁciency, even with inadequate information
about the cost structure of the polluting ﬁrms.
In case of imperfect competition, however, ﬂexibility has also another effect,
because in such markets commitment plays an important role (see e.g., Tirole, 1988). In
some cases it is advantageous for a ﬁrm in oligopoly to be able to ’burn its bridges’. The
ability to bind itself to certain actions gives the ﬁrm a relatively strong position towards a
competitor. More ﬂexibility by its nature decreases the possibilities to commit.
The characteristics of government policy inﬂuence the ﬂexibility of a ﬁrm. If
government policy is implemented by rigid prescriptions, it is a commitment for the ﬁrm.
If, on the contrary, the government bases its policy on incentives, ﬁrms are more ﬂexibile
so that they have less commitments. Brander and Spencer (1983) analyzed the differences
between trade policies when trade can be characterized as an international oligopoly. If
governments want high proﬁtsfor their home ﬁrms, they may want to providehome ﬁrms
with commitment via their trade policy.
In a similar way, environmental policy instruments may affect the international
competitiveness of ﬁrms. It was found that environmental standards are unambiguously
’better’ than taxes, in a multistage static model of international rivalry where allocative
efﬁciency can be neglected (Ulph, 1992). Under standards, ﬁrms gain commitment, so
that they earn more proﬁts, while regulators reach the same environmental target.
This paper shows that this conclusion depends on the type of investment strategy
applied by ﬁrms. In a multistage static model, investment decisions are taken once and
for all and that is another type of commitment for ﬁrms. In order to relax this implicit
assumption, the richer frameworkof differential games is needed. In that framework,one
can distinguish different types of strategies. In particular, an open-loop decision strategy
means that the ﬁrms choose their actions at the beginning of the planning period and stick
to these actions no matter what happens. This implies a relatively large commitment,
similar to the multistage static model. A feedback decision strategy, though, means that
the ﬁrms condition their actions on observations on the current state of affairs. This
implies that ﬁrms are not committed and can react indirectly on each other’s past actions.
2It will be shown that the result that standards are ’better’ than taxes is ambiguous
anddependson thetypeofinvestment strategyappliedby theﬁrm. Tobemoreprecise, for
open-loop investment strategies the results from multistage modelling are conﬁrmed, but
for feedback investment strategies it is ambiguous whether standards or taxes are ’better’.
Feedback strategies lead to more strategic interaction, which drives the ﬁrms to higher
investment with lower proﬁts. Under taxes this effect is mitigated due to the substitution
between energy and capital. That does not occur under standards, because in that case
ﬁrms are at a corner solution for their energy use and do not substitute between energy
and capital. Therefore, the use of standards reduces over-investments, which improves
proﬁts, as was found before, but it also increases over-investments, which reduces proﬁts,
since the mitigating effect is absent. The net effect can go both ways.
Section 2 presents international rivalry as a differential game model of two com-
peting ﬁrms. Section 3 derives the equilibrium to this model under feedback investment
strategies. A comparison of the equilibrium under taxes and standards gives the main
result of the paper. The economic explanation for this result is provided at the end of this
section. In section 4 we discuss choices of parameter values and how results depend on
these values. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 An international duopoly model
The model describes a duopoly where each competitor is situated in a different country
1
and faces the environmental policy of that country. The decision makers are ﬁrms and






times t and prefers high proﬁts for its home ﬁrm. Emissions are assumed to have local
effects only. Firms and countries are connected through the common market for outputs.
Each ﬁrmis aproﬁt maximizer. Throughoutthe wholepaper perfect foresightis assumed.
Environmental policy consists either of a tax on energy or of a standard on the use
of energy. It is assumed that emissions are directly related to energy use, which implies
that an emission tax or standard is equivalent to an energy tax or standard. The regulator
sets the level of the tax or the standard beforehand. Taxes,
￿











) . The regulator is assumed to have full information on the ﬁrm so that it can





). Under these assumptions, taxes and
1With equal environmental policy instrumentsin each country, the results also apply to a duopolyin one
country.
3standards result in the same energy use.














t, where r is
a constant rate of discount. Let
x












































































































































































































































0. The last condition
means that more capital increases the marginal productivity of energy. Firmsmust decide
on outputs and investments or, which is equivalent, on energy use and investments.





), include adjustment costs and acquisition costs.
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0. Investments add to the capital stock according
























i is the constant rate of depreciation. Summarizing, the duopoly is modelled as
the following differential game.















































































































































































































C. In case of a standard in country i and a tax in country j the differential game is a
combination of A and B.
3 Equilibrium and economic interpretation
3.1 Equilibrium strategies of energy use
Since energy use does not appear in the system dynamics, choices of a certain level of
energy have no effect on future periods. Therefore it is possible to solve for the
e
i at each












j). Assuming that each ﬁrm





2 can be formulated. These are the usual equilibrium conditions on
marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs.






















































































5C. In case of a standard in country i and a tax in country j, for country i equations (12)
to (14) must be satisﬁed while for country j equation (11) applies.
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0. This is reasonable since it is never optimal for a ﬁrm to have
an output where marginal revenues are negative.
If the two ﬁrms cooperate to maximize joint proﬁts, the ﬁrst order conditions for






































which is a modiﬁcation of (11). In this case effects on foreign proﬁts are included in the
marginal beneﬁts. Incase of standards, ﬁrst order conditions are a similar modiﬁcationof











3.2 Equilibrium strategies of investment
In this model,ﬁrmsare in a dynamicenvironmentwherethey have to makedecisions over
a longer period of time. Different strategies can be distinguished. If ﬁrms apply so called
open-loop strategies, they do not react on current state variables. Open-loop investment







). If playersapply so called Markov feedback





2). Therefore,each ﬁrmmust takeinto
account howits decisions will inﬂuencethe state of the system and hence futuredecisions












It is not clear ex ante how ﬁrms will react to a higher competing capital stock,








j is positive or negative. The effect of the competitor’s
capital stock on investment can be negative for the reason that a higher capital stock
of the competitor implies that the competitor produces more output. This decreases
the proﬁtability of output and investment to the home ﬁrm. The effect can be positive,
though, for the reason that a higher competing capital stock induces the ﬁrm to increase
its investments to keep its market share.
The equilibrium under environmental taxes and standards with open-loop invest-
ment strategies was analyzed in Feenstra, Kort, Verheyen and De Zeeuw (1996). To
6compute an equilibrium of feedback strategies for the general formulationof the differen-
tial game in section 2 is difﬁcult. But it is possible to approximate the steady-state capital
stock in the feedback equilibrium for explicit functional forms. Therefore consider the
following scenario:



















degree of substitutability between the products. Gross revenues,
R

















































Furthermore,it is assumed that the two countries are symmetric, that is, they are assumed
to have equal rates of depreciation and discount,
d and
r, equal production functions
and the same targets of environmental policy,









is straightforward to check that these functional forms satisfy the assumptions made in
section 2.
With these functional forms the expression for the Nash equilibrium value of











































































































































































































































































































i, is assumed to be negative. For standards, this requires
p
0 to be large
























) is not too large. In the sequel it is assumed that
this is the case.








). This gives an approximation to the feedback steady-state solution.
The approximation is found by application of the following algorithm:








step 2) Compute a second-order Taylor approximation of the objective function in the
neighbourhood of this starting point.
step 3) Determine the steady-state capital stocks for this approximation analytically.
step 4) Take the resulting steady state as the new starting point and return to step 2.
Repeat the algorithm until the new steady state is close enough to the old one.







), which is the steady-state capital





























4 , and steady-state capital stocks,
K, under taxes and
standards, for a target of environmental policy,
e. These strategies are approximations to










3 is interesting, because it determines thetype of strategic interaction




0 a ﬁrm reacts to a higher capital




0 the reverse is the case. The
followingproposition shows that the only possibly stable solution has a negative
P
3 under
a condition on the second order derivatives of (21), respectively (22). Furthermore a
8sufﬁcient condition for this solution to be stable is given. The conditions can be shown to
hold for reasonable values of the parameters both for taxes and for standards. The proof


























































then this solution is indeed stable.
In other words, under the conditions of the proposition, a unique stable feedback







), exists for the approximated objective






￿, both conditions in the proposition are satisﬁed, given the parameter values used.
Under standards, the conditions in the proposition are satisﬁed for most parameter values.


























i. Inthat case, multiplestable




e low enough, however, one can exclude this case (see appendix C).











3, is negative around the steady state, for reasonable parameter values.
Given the decreasing marginal productivity of capital it is to be expected that the











1, is negative. This is
indeed true for realistic values of
d,
r and
c, which is formally derived in appendix D. For
-unreasonably- large values of the parameters mentioned, it is possible to ﬁnd a positive
P
1, due to indirect effects of capital on equilibrium emissions.
Taxes and standards are to be compared in the feedback equilibrium steady state.
Figure1 shows steady-state capital stocks and ﬁrm proﬁtsfor both policy instrumentsas a
function of the environmental target. Before-tax proﬁts are also shown, to enable a good
comparison of taxes and standards. Of course, after-tax proﬁts are always substantially
lowered by the tax-payment. Since compensation is possible, it is better to compare
before-tax proﬁts with proﬁts under standards.
9ﬁgure 1: Capital stocks and proﬁts as a function of the environmental target.
Parametervalues:
￿






































____ : before-tax proﬁts
-.-.: after-tax proﬁts
10Remember that in this model, due to rivalrybetween ﬁrms, investment is too high,
so that proﬁts are lower, the higher the capital stock. It is clearly not true that taxes
always result in higher capital stocks than standards. On the contrary, for most parameter
values, standards result in higher capital stocks. That is due to the investments that are
carried out for strategic reasons. As a consequence proﬁts are larger under taxes for
most parameter values, even when after-tax proﬁts are considered. The value of
￿ is an
importantparameterin this respect, aswell as thestringency of environmentalpolicy. The
laxer environmentalpolicy, themore likely it is that standards result in higher steady-state
capital stocks and lower proﬁts than taxes
2.
3.3 Strategic effects
To explain the effect of strategic behaviour on investment under environmental policy,
we use so called Net Present Value expressions. These expressions can be derived from
forward integration of ﬁrst-order conditions. They give the properly discounted future
stream of extra proﬁts due to an additional unit of capital at time t (See e.g., Hartl and
Kort, 1996).
First, consider the cooperative solution. From the point of view of the two ﬁrms
















































C. From the ﬁrst-orderconditions the followingNet Present Value expression

























































The term in brackets gives the extra revenues at time s due to an additional unit of capital
stock, invested at time t. Future revenues are discounted with rate r and corrected for



















2Provided that a uniquestable equilibriumexists.
11of cooperation, the -negative- effect of increased home capital on earnings of the foreign
ﬁrm is taken into account. All strategic interaction is absent, since the ﬁrms cooperate.
Second, consider equilibria where the ﬁrms compete in a Cournot-Nash fashion.
The Net Present Value expression for ﬁrms that choose investments according to an


















































































try to inﬂuence energy and, hence, output decisions of their competitor with their capital























0, when taxes are applied as an instrument of environmental policy, this








0because ﬁrms are on the boundary of a binding constraint. In that case the
strategic effect is absent and investments are lower.
Finally consider the Net Present Value expression when ﬁrms use feedback in-
vestment strategies. This requires ﬁrst-order conditions for an equilibrium, which can for
































































































































i denotes the shadow value of own capital to ﬁrm i. Its value is determined by









i because of feedback reactions. Thevariable
￿
i
j denotes the shadow value of foreign capital to ﬁrm i. Condition (31) determines
its value. Note that these ﬁrst-order conditions are not sufﬁcient to actually compute


























































































































































12In case of standards in both countries, both ﬁrms are at a corner solution for energy use.

















































































































i. This effect can be strong enough to outweigh the ﬁrst strategic effect. From a



















































i for all t, the strategic incentive for










i captures the indirect strategic effect. If ﬁrm i increases its in-







i. The shadow price
￿
i
j denotes the valuation by ﬁrm i of such a change
in ﬁrm j’s investment. Thus
￿
i
j gives the valuation by ﬁrm i of an additional amount
of capital owned by ﬁrm j. This is given by the properly discounted ﬂow of marginal
decreases in ﬁrm i’s revenues if ﬁrm j owns an extra amount of capital (cf. (33) and








i is negative, which we have shown to be
the case for reasonable parameter values (cf. proposition 1), then the additional strategic









i, can be higher for standards than for taxes, since
ﬁrmsare less ﬂexiblein case of bindingstandards anddo not substitute energyfor capital.









marginal increase in capital
K
i leads ﬁrm j to invest less and hence to decrease its capital
stock,
K







whether j’s use of energy also decreases. If substitution effects dominate,
e
j increases.
In case of standards, substitution between production factors - i.e. an increase in
e
j in
reaction to a decrease in
K












j equals zero. In case of taxes, on the contrary, the ﬁrm is ﬂexible to adjust
13its use of energy in an optimal way to the capital stocks. Substitution between energy
and capital then partly cancels the effect on output of an increased capital stock. That










can be greater with standards than with taxes, provided substitution effects dominate
marginal-productivity effects.
The proposition contradicts earlier conclusions by Ulph (1992). He derived that
standards always result in less strategic investments than taxes. Ulph used a multistage
static model. That implied that his subgame-perfect equilibrium is equivalent to an equi-
librium with feedback strategies for energy use, but open-loop strategies for investment,
as represented by the Net Present Value expression (28). His model does not allow for
strategic interaction between ﬁrms in investment strategies. Only then the result holds
that taxes always provide larger incentives for investment than standards.
To conclude, it is not generally true that standards moderate strategic overinvest-
ment when ﬁrms react on each others behaviour by adjustments in their investment plans.
Although standards commit ﬁrms to a certain use of energy input, they may drive ﬁrms to
moreinvestment thantaxes. Inthat case theuse ofstandards asacommitmentdevicedoes
not work. Then, the use of taxes as an environmental policy instrument is to be preferred
when, next to environmental targets, proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms are an important objective
to the government.
4 Comparative statics for parameter values
Figure 1 shows that standards may result in more strategic investment than taxes. As
a consequence, ﬁrm proﬁts are higher under taxes than under standards. For some
strict environmental policy targets the reverse is true, however. This section discusses
the values chosen for the parameters that may inﬂuence this result. We show some
comparative static results that indicate how the difference between taxes and standards
changes with parameter values. The relationship between the parameters of the model
and the steady-state values of the capital stock in the feedback solution is complex. It
involves the approximation algorithm and the computation of the roots of a third degree
polynomial in the third step of this approximation algorithm. Therefore we can not give
simple expressions that link parameter values to the conditions in the propositions. But
numerical experimentation gives some clues about the direction of changes.
First consider the parameter
￿ in the production function. The literature on
14econometric production functions provides empirical estimates of returns to scale in
large energy-intensive industries. These gave a range around 1.2 (Morrison, 1993, 1994,







1must hold. Given that the Cobb-Douglas coefﬁcient of energy
equals
1
2, returns to scale then vary between 1 and 1.5. Compared to 1.2, this seems




enough incentives for ﬁrmsto reduce energy use and environmental policy is superﬂuous.
Therefore, we took the relatively low value 1 for this price.
ﬁgure 2: Emissions for no policy case, as a function of
￿.
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Figure 2 depicts emissions, when no environmental policy is applied and
p
e has the
value 1. It shows that for values of
￿ close to 1, even with this low value for
p
e,t h e
range of meaningful emission goals is limited. When
￿ is high, energy is a relatively
unimportant production factor, and for lax environmental policy goals, environmental
policy is unnecessary. The higher the priceof energy,
p
e, the moreimportantthis effect is.
For d, the rate of depreciation, we took the value 0.10. For r, the rate of discount
we took the value 0.08. Figure 3 shows the effect of different values for d. If d is
higher, capital depreciates faster. That implies that commitment with regard to future
output provided by an additional unit of capital decreases. The consequence is a lower
steady-state capital stock anda smaller differencebetween standardsand taxes. Ford high
15enough, the difference changes sign, because strategic interaction through commitment
on energy use dominates strategic interaction through commitment on investments. Then
taxes result in more strategic investment than standards. Increases in r have a similar
effect. A higher rate of discount implies that the future is less important relative to the
present. Current costs of investment then become important relative to future earnings.
Thesteady-statecapitalstockhencedecreases. Thedynamicaspectsthatcauseadifference
between environmental policy instruments in strategic interaction through commitment
on investment loose importance. As a result, the difference between standards and taxes
decreases and eventually changes sign, when the static aspect of strategic interaction
through commitment on energy use dominates.






































____ : before-tax proﬁts
-.-.: after-tax proﬁts
For c, that is a parameter for adjustment costs of investment, we took the value 2.
The higher c, the higher the costs of investment, and the lower therefore the steady-state
stock of capital. Changes in capital stock become more expensive, so that commitment
through investment is less attractive. Therefore the differences between standards and





do not inﬂuence each others prices. In that case both ﬁrms are monopolists and strategic
effects disappear. Environmental taxes and standards then have equal effects on ﬁrms
in the model above. The higher a, the more effect ﬁrms have on each others prices and
the more important strategic effects become. For
a
=
1the outputs of the two ﬁrms are
perfect substitutes. Figure4 shows equilibriumcapital stocks and proﬁt rates for different
values of a. The difference between standards and taxes increases with a, because strate-
giceffectsgaininimportance. Forthatreasonwetookatobeequalto1intheotherﬁgures.
17ﬁgure 4: Effect on capital stock and proﬁts of changes in a.
Parametervalues:
￿





































____ : before-tax proﬁts
-.-.: after-tax proﬁts
18The results in this section show again that it is not true that taxes always result in more
investment than standards for strategic reasons, and therefore lower proﬁt rates. The
reverse, that standards lead to more investment and lower proﬁts is neither valid. Which
environmental policy instrument is ’better’,which means here that it results in the highest
proﬁts for a given emission target, depends on the precise values of the parameters.
5 Conclusions
Thispaperisconcernedwithinternationalrivalryandenvironmentalpolicy. Inamultistage
static framework Ulph (1992) found that environmental taxes lead to higher investment
than standards. Firms that compete on an international market have an incentive to
increase investments to gain strategic advantage. But in equilibrium, competitors act
similar so that higher capital stocks, more output and lower proﬁts result. Therefore,
ceteris paribus, governments prefer standards rather than taxes, due to the reduction in
strategic investment. This was conﬁrmed in Feenstra, Kort, Verheyen and De Zeeuw
(1996), in a differential-game framework with open-loop investment strategies. The
differences between environmental taxes and standards as regards their effect on strategic
behaviour are due to their inﬂuence on the ﬂexibility of ﬁrms. Standards reduce a ﬁrm’s
ﬂexibility in its choice of emissions, while taxes do not.
In this paper, ﬂexibility in investment behaviour is introduced. More speciﬁcally,
we consider feedback investment strategies. Under feedback investment strategies, ﬁrms
have to take into account that the competitor will react through its investment on marginal
increases in the capital stock. The effects of environmental standards and taxes on this
type of strategic behaviour differ. It turns out that it cannot -as in the case of open-
loop investment strategies- be stated that taxes will always lead to more investments than
standards. It is shown in the paper that if substitution effects between production factors
are large enough, investment is larger under standards than under taxes. Ceteris paribus,
governments then prefer taxes rather than standards as environmental policy instrument.
Note that in the current model, consumer surpluses are neglected. It is implicitly
assumed that ﬁrms sell a substantial part of their output to third countries. Ulph (1996)
and Kennedy (1994) include consumer surplus in a multistage static game. Since it is in
the interest of consumers that competition between the two ﬁrms results in more output,
they favour larger investments. Inclusion of consumer surplus would therefore require a
19differentvaluation of high capital stocks. When consumer surplus is important,taxes may
be preferred by the government over standards, while still taxes lead to more investment
than standards.
A differential game model of a duopoly describes the behaviour of ﬁrms that
compete in an international market. After equilibrium behaviour on energy choice has
been inserted, a capital accumulation game results. The two ﬁrms choose investment
rates, to maximize their objectives, given government policy and the strategy of the
competitor. Feedback equilibria in capital accumulation games are derived in Reynolds
(1987) and in Fershtman and de Zeeuw (1992). The game in this paper is a bit different,
becauseinvestmenthasindirecteffectsonoutputthroughenergyuse. That impliesthatthe
objectivefunctionis not linear quadraticincapital stocks likeinthetwopapersmentioned
above. But it ispossiblewiththehelpof anapproximationalgorithmtoextendthemethod
employed in Fershtman and de Zeeuw and ﬁnd approximations to the steady state.
The indirect effects through energy choices and the approximation step imply that
equilibriuminvestment depends in a complex wayon domesticand foreigncapital stocks.
Inparticular, thesign of thederivativeof equilibriuminvestment toforeigncapital may be
either negativeor positive. Conditionsaregivenforstableequilibriathat arecharacterized
by a negative sign of this derivative. Although these conditions capture the cases that are
economicallymost relevant,an exceptional case with apositive derivativeis still possible.
Flaherty (1980) analyzes a capital accumulation game with symmetric and asym-
metric equilibria. With the help of linear approximations, it is shown that the asymmetric
equilibriaarestable andthesymmetricequilibriumisnot. Althoughina differentcontext,
this shows that stable asymmetric equilibriaare certainlyan option in this type of models.
For tractability reasons, our analysis has been restricted to the case of symmetry, where
both countries apply the same type of environmental policy. Extension to the asymmetric
case whereonecountryappliestaxes and theother standardsisan option. However,wedo
not expect that a (complex) analysis of the asymmetric case would change our conclusion
with respect to strategic behaviour.
20A Details of the algorithm






d step of the algorithm in the main
text.
Step 2: A second order Taylor approximation of the objective function of the differential














































































































For a linear-quadratic objective function, the analytical expression of the steady state can
























0 ,h a s
been solved by Reynolds (1987) and by Fershtman and De Zeeuw (1992). Below, the
approach of the latter paper is followed to obtain a solution to the approximated game.
Consider the differential game with
￿
i given by (A.1) as the objective function.
Thisisagamewithaquadraticobjectivefunction,lineardynamicsandtwostatevariables.
The dynamic-programming approach is used to ﬁnd a linear Markov-perfect equilibrium.



























































































































0 a scalar. The




























































Because of symmetry, it sufﬁces to consider the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of
only one ﬁrm. For the other ﬁrm the computations are analogous. Insert the optimal
solution for investment, given by (A.6), and the value function (A.3), with derivatives
(A.4) and (A.5), into equation (A.2) and note that it must hold for each K. Equations





























































































































































If the investments strategies (A.6) must also result in a stable capital growth path, two






















































































































































































Equation (A.15) deﬁnes a circle with radius
￿ and centre at the origin. The polar coor-
dinates
R and

















































































￿ .T h e
P
2 axis is left unchanged.







Rewrite equation (A.16) to an expression for
P
































































































































































































3 might be real or complex,
dependent on the values of
u and











































































































































































3 that satisfy the stability requirements































































































































































































































































￿ that satisfy condition (A.38) result
in a stable solution.
If there is only one such a real root, a corresponding unique feedback equilibrium
results. If more roots satisfy the stability requirements a situation of multiple equilibria






3 in the objective function.
25ﬁgure 5: Division of Q
1,Q




















































































































































































































































































































2 exists. Therefore, in this





4 . I nr e g i o n( 2 ) ,








2 exists, while other roots are not stable. Hence in this






















2 exist. When these are both larger than
b
4 multiple stable equilibria exist.
For any unique root
^





















0 . Together with the value for





3. Equation (A.8), or alternatively (A.9), gives
P
2. Finally equations






0. From (A.6) then follow equilibrium linear
feedback investment strategies. The steady-state value of capital is found as the solution
















































We have found an analytic solution to the problem for a Taylor approximation of







). The equilibrium steady-state







)of the algorithm. This procedure is repeated until
the resulting steady state is close enough to the starting point.
B Proof of proposition 1

























). Also note that if the root of equation (A.26),
y
























] is negative (positive).
In appendix A it is shown that for region (1) in ﬁgure 5 at most one stable root









0 (region 1b). From the assumptions made below equation (22) follows that
27only the latter region is relevant for proposition 1. It will be shown that indeed in region























































































































3, given the deﬁnition of
Q
2. The unique




2 (Seeappendix A). It must be the largest
root of thepolynomial. If thelargest rootis real, it must belarger than thelocal minimum,

















m , then theuniquesolution isalwaysstable.
The derivative of m with respect to
Q
1 can be shown to be negative in the region
concerned (region 1b). For ﬁxed
￿, m thereforereaches its minimum value,
m
























3. Note that for the














4 with respect to
Q
1 can be shown to be positive in the region
concerned. Hence,
b




















































































































































c. This concludes the proof of
proposition 1.
28C Exclusion of multiple equilibria under standards
































































































































































































e to be sufﬁciently
small. If (C.2) holds, region (4) is excluded.
D Sign of P
1




















































2. It follows that any stable solution











2) satisﬁes inequality (D.1) and
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